By Claudia Ionita
Introduction
In recent years, tensions between the Muslim Uyghurs of the Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and the Chinese government have started to grow, with allegations of repressive measures which vary from restrictions on performing prayers in mosques or fasting during Ramadhan to imprisonment in internment camps attracting condemnation from numerous humanitarian organisations. Oftentimes this subject is portrayed through the angle of religious misunderstandings, and while accurate, such an approach does not paint a full picture of the factors that have led to its outbreak. The roots of its origins are much more far-reaching.
First divide, then conquer
Autonomy arrangements are a common encounter throughout the world, and the purpose that they serve is seemingly noble: protecting the rights of a state’s vulnerable groups while maintaining its territorial integrity. Yet granting autonomy to a region is, from a political perspective, also a form of compromise between its inhabitants, who might wish for independence, and the state’s desire for complete sovereignty. Thus, it is not surprising that differences between autonomous groups and state actors can lead to conflicts, as illustrated by the Uyghur crisis. According to Chandra, the term ethnic identity refers to identity categories in which membership is based on characteristics associated with descent. Following this definition, the Uyghur ethnic identity is based on common Turkic ancestry, with members of this minority being seen as native to the XUAR. Their strong historical claim to the region coupled with the religious and cultural discrepancies between Uyghurs and the Han Chinese, the ethnic group who predominates most regions of Communist China, can perhaps explain the government’s reticence to negotiate and reach a common agreement for autonomy. Fearing the possibility of such differences leading to secession, they opted instead to impose autonomy without prior consultation with the Uyghur minority. Subsequently, Uyghur leaders pressured Chairman Mao to act in accordance with Lenin’s doctrine of self-determination which would entail the creation of an independent Uyghur state. Despite Beijing’s refusal and further attempts to thwart the idea of a “Republic of Uyghurstan”, throughout the 1950s many members of the Uyghur minority remained hopeful for eventual self-determination and a federal system. The CPC however claimed that Soviet federalism is incompatible with the Chinese situation and argued that providing regional autonomy to minzu (ethnic minorities) instead was a more advantageous option.
The administrative prowess of the CPC’s policies can further be seen in the decision to divide Xinjiang into different autonomies. While belonging in name to the Uyghurs, the newly established XUAR was now a mosaic of autonomous zones, many of which belonged to smaller minzu whose political views were to a certain extent aligned more with Beijing’s rather than with the Uyghurs’. This helped erode the demographic weight of the Uyghur minority, casting doubt on the idea that the region was primarily populated by them (hence weakening their claims for independence) while also creating ethnic divisions in longstanding communities. Furthermore, unlike in the Soviet Union, where a policy of religious and ethnic assimilation was in place (for instance, Jewish individuals were promoted to positions of power within the party), in China, Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities were largely ignored politically. A long term consequence of such actions is the lack of representation in the CPC of minority voices, and as a result, the dominion of the Han Chinese viewpoints on minzu issues. This is illustrated by the implementation of laws favouring Hans at the expense of minorities. The 1952 “Program for Implementing Minzu Regional Authority” stipulated that autonomous regions are to have governing bodies but they need to include Hans members as well and remain under the supervision and control of higher organs. Similarly, the military was no longer under local discretion, with soldiers and security personnel now falling under CPC control. In the Xinjiang region, this meant the dismantling of the Ili National Army which constituted primarily of Uyghurs and Kazakhs (another Turkic minority). The 1984 Autonomy Law, while at first glance an attempt to grant increased powers to autonomous governments, further stripped the autonomy of the XUAR, ensuring that legal and political supremacy lies with the National People’s Congress. While autonomous governments have the right to draft statues on autonomy and specific regulations, their decisions still have to wait for Congress’ approval. Additionally, Beijing maintains discretionary power over the implementation of autonomy in Xinjiang, overviewing issues such as policing and resource allocation in the area. Legal scholar Yu Xingzhong, upon analysing these legal provisions, concluded that they indeed do not reflect the general conception of what state autonomy should entail and are instead more restrictive. It can be said that these increased restrictions on the Uyghur minority have led almost paradoxically to a heightened sense of pride among the Uyghurs regarding their distinct ethnic identity. As a consequence, the number of violent incidents and riots against the Han population and Beijing rule has also begun to rise starting with the 1980s, with protesters going as far as to bomb and attack police stations.
Changing times?
The 1991 breakdown of the Soviet Union further escalated Beijing’s fears that the Uyghurs will attempt to take stronger action toward full independence. The formation of the “Shanghai Five” group in 1996, an organisation whose members consisted of former Soviet states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) alongside China and the Russian Federation, represented for China a means of furthering its dominance in the Central Asian region. In the context of the Uyghur conflict, it was a way of exercising more powerful political control. Beijing pressured the members of this new organisation to repress Uyghur separatists active in their territories, pledging in aid and substantial loans. Despite condemnation from the international community, the Chinese government did manage to obtain the extradition of Uyghur separatists from the member countries as well as from the states of Pakistan and Nepal.
The tensions between the Uyghurs and the CPC were further exacerbated by the 9/11 attacks that took place in the United States. These events were an opportunity for China to not only defend its policies of “pseudo autonomy” in the XUAR but further continue its crackdown on the potential threat of Uyghur secession. The recently started war on terror made it possible for the CPC to label Uyghur dissidents as “violent Muslim terrorists” rather than separatists, with government press statements framing the Uyghur conflict as one based on religious terrorism rather than ethnic differences and desire for self-determination. Reports from the Party with titles such as “Terrorist Activities Perpetrated by ‘Eastern Turkistan’ Organizations and their Ties with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban” created the impression of an existence of a vast network of Uyghur terrorists working to undermine not only China’s security, but the world’s. Additionally, this document tried to explain the violent incidents in the XUAR during the 80s and 90s as premeditated terrorist attacks carried out by a formerly unknown network. Needless to say, this surprised scholars familiar with the plight of the Uyghurs. Even if attacks had taken place in those years, they were never of the magnitude of a “terrorsim”, lacking the organisation characteristic of such acts and being more spontaneous in nature.
This deliberate mislabelling and spreading of false information represents an attempt at self-preservation: finding a common enemy to unite one’s subjects against. It can be argued that in this conflict the CPC spreads rumours concerning the Uyghur’s intentions as a means justifying violence against them and furthering a nationalistic agenda. The secession of any region from the mainland would create a precedent which would not only violate the CPC’s fundamental principle of state unity but could also lead to other attempts at independence, hence the need for the subjugation of any such effort. Furthermore, the propagation of the narrative that dissenting Uyghurs are terrorist represents has had grave consequences. The label of “terrorist” in the context of a Global war on Terror further altered the relationship state-Uyghurs relationships, making the conflict increasingly difficult to be solved. In many ways, this worsening of Uyghur-state relations is a product of the associations of this label. While separatists may be sympathetic for some and overall integrated into society by having their grievances taken into consideration at the political level, under an ongoing global struggle against terrorism, citizens who go down that path are no longer able to be reintegrated into civil society. Following this logic, they must be eliminated in order to protect the state’s sovereignty and the world as a whole.
The more immediate result of these state sponsored rumours regarding Uyghurs and terrorist activities helped pass amendments to the Chinese criminal code in 2001. These changes were primarily concerned with adding terrorism to the already existing list of crimes. This new definition for terrorism was fairly broad (one could even speculate, purposefully so) hence what amounted to be punishment and how it should be became rather subjective. Fast forwarding into the future, and the Uyghur minority becaem even more persecuted in the XUAR due to its possible ties with radical terrorism.
First divide, then conquer
The newly established focus on the dangers of terrorism, a malum recognised on the international scale force of evil, made it possible for the CPC to impose a more aggressive approach in terms of controlling Uyghur though and/or behaviour. For instance, programs were built in which young Uyghurs, usually women, were (Chinese) language training and ideological courses, then Uyghurs sent to other regions in order to work in factories. Presented as opportunities for Uyghurs to advance economically, programs like these were in fact meant to incorporate rural Uyghurs into the motherland and encouraging them to develop an identity similar to that of the Han. Despite the fact that numerous Uyghur individuals took part in these initiatives, most did not abandon their own ethnic identity or became loyal to the CPC. While these measures helped sow some economic and cultural division among the Uyghurs, the community remained at large united around a disdain for Beijing rule. Similarly, attempts to “assimilate” Uyghur students in Xinjiang boarding schools through anti-religious propaganda backfired, with many graduates embracing Islam more intensely than before.
The current attempts at dismantling Uyghur identity have grown more sinister in their intensity. According to recent data from the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, the detention camps that have sprung across XUAR in the last few years are not, as insisted by Beijing, voluntary re-education institutions for countering extremism, but rather prisons. Uyghur individuals detained in these secretive places are undergoing a brutal process of ethnic obliteration, starting from their religious practices and spanning to all other aspects of their Uyghur identity, which often features rape and torture. The State actively encourages, (better said, forces) marriage between Han men and Uyghur women. Reports from XUAR show that Han Chinese officials and locals force Uyghur women into relationships, taking advantage of the fact that many of these women have relatives in internment camps. These forced inter-ethnic couplings are yet another means of erasing identity and trying to destroy elements which could serve as a unifying force. Without a common religion, goal, culture and ethnicity it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Uyghur minority to unite for the singular cause of liberation.
Conclusion
The ethnic cleansing currently taking place in Xinjiang should be seen as more than anti-Muslim fervour on behalf of the Chinese government. It represents, instead, another piece in the puzzle for complete dominion. As shown time and time again during these past few decades, the desire for a unitary Chinese state is strong, but the Uyghur fight for secession is stronger. Still, no real change can be made without international intervention and condemnation.
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